Political Law

People of the Philippines vs Mario Serzo, Jr.

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G.R. No. 118435 – 274 SCRA 553 – Legal Ethics – Duty of Counsel de Oficio

Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill Of Rights; Rights of the Accused – Right to Counsel; Limitations; Uncooperative Accused

In January 1991, Mario Serzo, Jr. was arraigned scheduled for arraignment for murder but he appeared in court without counsel. The court appointed a counsel de oficio for him but he insisted to be represented by a counsel of his choice. Hence, the arraignment was rescheduled for February 1991. In February 1991, Serzo still appeared without counsel and the court appointed a counsel de oficio for him. This time, Serzo agreed and he was arraigned. During the presentation of prosecution evidence, Serzo was still unable to secure a de parte counsel and so the court retained the de oficio counsel for Serzo without his objection.

In August 1991, the prosecution rested its case. In November 1991, the initial presentation of defense evidence, Serzo moved for the cancellation of hearings on the ground that he wanted to be represented by counsel of his choice but in the subsequent hearings, no counsel de parte appeared for him. In March 1992, the counsel de oficio was discharged because Serzo did not want to cooperate with him.

In April 1992, Serzo again appeared without a counsel de parte hence the court appointed a new de oficio counsel who merely moved for resetting.

In August 1992, Serzo again appeared without a counsel de parte. This time the court appointed a PAO lawyer as Serzo’s counsel de oficio. However, the subsequent hearing were again postponed due to Serzo’s refusal to cooperate with the de oficio counsel. In November 1992, the court gave the defense one last chance to present evidence but no defense evidence was presented.

In August 1994, the court convicted Serzo of murder. Serzo is now questioning his conviction on the ground that he was uncounseled throughout the proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not Serzo’s conviction is proper.

HELD: Yes. The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. This right is granted to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the state.

Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.

Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the states’ and the offended party’s equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused’s option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.

Serzo was given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his subsequent appearances in court without such counsel and his act of allowing this situation to continue until the presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even appears that he was merely delaying his own presentation of evidence on purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and the orderly administration of justice.

Serzo did not demonstrate in what way the services of his counsels de oficio were unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance substantiating his claim that he was not effectively represented. In short, he was afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by his own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such right. It taxes the mind to think that, almost two years since appellant first invoked his right to be represented by counsel de parte, he still could not find one who would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he cooperate with his court-named lawyers.

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