Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights; Rights of the Accused – Right to Counsel de Oficio Even if Represented by Counsel de Parte
John Joseph Lumanlaw was arrested in November 2002 for allegedly selling illegal drugs. He was scheduled to be arraigned in January 2003 but since then, his arraignment was postponed fourteen times and was un-arraigned for almost two years. Lumanlaw’s counsel moved for the dismissal of the case against him twice for violation of his right to speedy trial but both motions were denied. As a result, Lumanlaw’s counsel filed a petition for mandamus to compel Judge Eduardo Peralta, Jr. to dismiss the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court found that only two of the fourteen postponements were valid. All the rest were based on unreasonable grounds. One of the reasons why the arraignment was postponed was the absence of Lumanlaw’s counsel de parte. However, when his counsel de parte was absent, Lumanlaw asked the court to have a Public Attorney be appointed as counsel de oficio for purposes of arraignment. However, Lumanlaw’s request was denied by Judge Peralta on the ground that he already has a counsel de parte. The Supreme Court found the denial to be improper.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the accused’s counsel de parte is not prohibited, not even by the Constitution, especially when the accused themselves request that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused has no counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment.
An accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the state’s and the offended party’s equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused’s option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.
Like other personal rights, the right to a counsel de parte is waivable, so long as 1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law; and 2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made.
