G.R. No. 246017 – 890 Phil. 1159 – Criminal Law – Special Penal Laws – R.A. No. 7610; Anti-Child Abuse Law – Section 10(a) – Specific Criminal Intent to Debase
In February 2014, Maria Consuelo Malcampo-Repollo, a teacher, pinched and slapped her minor student AAA. Her actions caused extreme fear on AAA. This caused AAA to be scared of Maria Consuelo whenever he sees her. The trial court convicted Maria Consuelo for violating Sec. 10a, RA 7610 and sentenced her to prision mayor.
Maria Consuelo questions her conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the specific criminal intent to “debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.” Maria Consuelo argued that if ever she is criminally liable, it should only be for slight physical injuries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction is proper.
HELD: Yes. In this case, the prosecution need not prove that Maria Consuelo had the specific criminal intent to “debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.” There are four kinds of cases under Section 10a, RA 7610, which are: (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. Maria Consuelo is being prosecuted under the first kind which does not need proof of specific criminal intent unlike the three others (Note in Araneta vs People, 2008, the SC ruled that in cases of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation, the prosecution need not prove that the acts complained of have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts).
The SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that the evidence of physical abuse alone was enough to secure a conviction, and the prosecution need not prove that the impugned acts prejudiced AAA’s development.
The act of debasing, degrading, or demeaning the child’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being has been characterized as a specific intent in some forms of child abuse. The specific intent becomes relevant in child abuse when: (1) it is required by a specific provision in Republic Act No. 7610, as for instance, in lascivious conduct (Note in San Juan vs People, 2023, the SC emphasized that acts under Sec. 3(b)(2), RA 7610, require proof of specific criminal intent); or (2) when the act is described in the information as one that debases, degrades, or demeans the child’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. In this case, the type of child abuse charged against Maria Consuelo does not specifically require the presence of specific criminal intent. Further, the Information filed against her did not allege that she acted with such specific criminal intent.
