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A.C. No. 198-J – 39 SCRA 106 – Political Law – Basic Principles – Separation of Powers
Catalino Macaraig, Jr. worked in the Department of Justice for sixteen years before he was appointed as a Court of First Instance judge in 1970. He took his oath but he cannot make his court operational because a court room was unavailable and the local government which was supposed to fund it cannot do so. Macaraig considered taking a leave of absence but the Secretary of Justice convinced him to render duty with the Office of the Secretary of Justice. The basis of such function was the old administrative code:
Section 83, Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, reads as follows: “Bureaus and offices under the Department of Justice. — The Department of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Office of the Solicitor General, the Courts of First Instance and the Inferior Courts, xxx”
Later, Paz Garcia filed an administrative complaint against Macaraig alleging that he is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge as well as violations of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Garcia said that Macaraig failed to render his duty as a judge despite receiving salary therefor. Garcia also questioned the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of the executive in charge of prosecution of cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig may be held administratively liable.
HELD: No. Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances does not constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being ‘a judge without a sala’, but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.
