G.R. No. 148339 – 492 Phil. 314 – 452 SCRA 174 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Powers of the State – Police Power – Lawful Subject; Lawful Means – Invalid Exercise of Police Power; Unlawful Means
In 1998, the City of Lucena enacted two ordinances. The first ordinance granted the Lucena Grand Central Terminal the exclusive right to operate a transport terminal in the city. The second ordinance banned all bus companies from operating their own terminal and directed them to use the Lucena Grand Central Terminal.
Jac Liner, Inc. challenged the validity of the ordinances as they were alleged to be in violation against the constitutional prohibition on monopolies.
The City argued that the challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to “regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places.”
The City likewise argued that the affected private terminals are nuisances that caused traffic and congestion to the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances are valid.
HELD: The first ordinance is valid. It is within the right of the City to enact it.
Using the two-fold test, the second ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power.
For a law to be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a lawful subject and a lawful method.
Solving traffic problems is a lawful subject.
However, the method used by the City is not lawful.
Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are. But the solution is not to ban the terminals. The power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles does not extend to terminals.
Neither are terminals public nuisances as the City argues. The operation of Jac Liner and other affected terminals is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.
But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se.
A nuisance per accidens may not be abated via an ordinance. A judicial proceeding is the remedy against a nuisance per accidens.
But the centralized terminal actually solved the traffic problem of Lucena City, doesn’t the end justify the means?
No. Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.
