Political Law

Ernesto Francisco, Jr. vs House of Representatives

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G.R. No. 160261; G.R. No. 160262; G.R. No. 160263; G.R. No. 160277; G.R. No. 160292; G.R. No. 160295; G.R. No. 160310; G.R. No. 160318; G.R. No. 160342; G.R. No. 160643; G.R. No. 160360; G.R. No. 160365; G.R. No. 160370; G.R. No. 160376; G.R. No. 160392; G.R. No. 160397; G.R. No. 160403; G.R. No. 160405 – 460 Phil. 830 – 415 SCRA 44 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – General Principles – Interpretation / Construction of the Constitution

Article XI – Accountability of Public Officers – Impeachment; When is an impeachment complaint initiated?

Statutory Construction – Letter of the Law vs Spirit of the Law – Intent of the Framers

In June 2003, Joseph Estrada filed with the House of Representatives a complaint for impeachment against then Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” In August 2003, the complaint was indorsed by three congressmen to the Committee on Justice. In October 2003, the complaint was dismissed for being insufficient in substance.

A day later, a second impeachment complaint was filed against CJ Davide by Cong. Gilbert Teodoro. The complaint was signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the lower house. Cong. Teodoro filed it with the Secretary General of the Lower House.

Several concerned citizens including taxpayers, lawyers, lawmakers, etc. petitioned with the Supreme Court to declare the second impeachment case as unconstitutional for violating Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

The respondents in these cases which included the Senate President, the House Speaker, and other respondents-in-intervention moved for the dismissal of the cases on the grounds that the petitions are premature (the second impeachment case was not yet received by the Senate) and that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to resolve matters involving impeachment – it was argued, among others, that in accordance with Sec. 3(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which states that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment” it is clear that issues affecting impeachment proceedings are outside the jurisdiction of courts and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction in impeachment cases is with the Senate sitting as an impeachment court. Thus, issues on the constitutionality of an impeachment complaint may only be resolved by the Senate sitting as an impeachment court.

Speaker Joe De Venecia further argued that no first impeachment was initiated. He argued that since the Estrada complaint was dismissed by the Committee on Justice, there was no impeachment case “initiated” to speak of. He explained that filing and initiating are different if construed with Sections 3(1) and 3(5), Art. XI as well as with Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings by the 12th Congress. Sec. 3(1) provides: “The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.” Meanwhile, the Lower House’s Rules on Impeachment provides that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These mean that only the lower house may initiate an impeachment proceeding, thus, a complaint for impeachment may be filed but only the lower house acting as a collective body may initiate the impeachment proceeding and that collective action may be deemed to have been initiated if favorably indorsed to the Senate. In this case, the first complaint (Estrada complaint) was not deemed to have been initiated because the lower house as a collective body never acted on it because the complaint was dismissed in the committee level.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitions should be dismissed.

HELD: No. In accordance with the expanded jurisdiction of courts enshrined in Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the courts have jurisdiction over the petitions.

The author of the Constitution is the Filipino people who intended to vest in the judiciary the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. In accordance with this provision, there has been a plethora of cases in which the SC exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits or “judicially discoverable standards” for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

The SC also emphasized that in interpreting the Constitution, the following must be observed:

1. VERBA LEGIS: wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed;

2. LEGIS EST ANIMA or the reason of the law is the soul of the law. Where there is ambiguity, words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers (Note: In Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, the SC also stated that “The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof”); and

3. UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT or let the matter rather have effect than be defeated. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

As regards the arguments raised by Speaker De Venecia, the same was a misreading of Sec. 3(1), Art. XI of the Constitution. The impeachment rules of the 12th Congress contravened Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution. The SC adopted the explanation of Father Joaquin Bernas who was invited as an amicus curiae in these cases. Father Bernas explained that “to initiate” means “to file.” Initiate must be understood in its ordinary meaning. The “impeachment proceeding” is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the “impeachment proceeding” initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

Thus, to initiate an impeachment proceeding involves the (1) act of filing and (2a) referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, (2b) by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. It is clear then that the Estrada Complaint was initiated in August 2003 and that the second complaint filed by Cong. Teodoro in October 2003 was filed within the one-year ban.

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