G.R. No. 216930; G.R. No. 217451; G.R. No. 217752; G.R. No. 218045; G.R. No. 218098; G.R. No. 218123; G.R. No. 218465 – 841 Phil. 724 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – General Principles – Interpretation / Construction of the Constitution – Self-Executing Provisions – Intent of the Framers
Constitutionality of the K to 12 Law and the Kindergarten Education Act
The Legislative Department – Legislative Function – Enrolled Bill Theory – Journal
In 2012, R.A. No. 10157 or the Kindergarten Education Act (KEA) was enacted. It made kindergarten mandatory and a pre-requisite for elementary education.
In May 2013, R.A. No. 10533 or the K to 12 Law was enacted. It expanded the 10-year basic education cycle to 13 years.
Thereafter, students, lawyers, teachers, non-teaching personnel, etc. filed petitions questioning the constitutionality of the two laws including the rules implementing them. Some of the arguments raised were:
- The K to 12 Law was not validly enacted as there was a discrepancy between the enrolled bill and the version signed by the president;
- The KEA and the K to 12 Law are contrary to Secs. 1 and 2, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution as it expanded basic education cycle;
- The K to 12 Law and its IRRs which provided for the use of mother tongue as primary language of instruction for Grade 1 to 3 pupils contravene Secs. 6 and 7, Art. XIV which provided that Filipino shall be the official language of instruction while regional languages (mother tongue) shall only be auxiliary media of instruction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the K to 12 Law is valid.
HELD: Yes.
1. The K to 12 Law was validly enacted. The petitioners alleged that the enrolled bill which the President signed into law varies significantly from the reconciled version of the bill as approved by Congress and reported in the Senate Journal in January 2013, and that the SC, pursuant to its ruling in Astorga vs Villegas, should look into the entries in the Journal to determine whether the K to 12 Law was duly enacted. This cannot be done. Such alleged discrepancy is not persuasive enough for the SC to look into the Journal.
Under the “enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed is conclusive not only as to its provisions but also as to its due enactment. The rationale behind the enrolled bill doctrine rests on the consideration that “the respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the Judiciary to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.”
In Astorga, the Enrolled Bill Doctrine was not applied for the reason that the Senate President admitted that the version he signed was different from what was deliberated upon; that it was a mistake signing the bill, hence, he withdrew his signature. In effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider. Without such attestation, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the SC was constrained to consult the entries in the journal to determine whether the text of the bill signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. This is not so in these petitions.
2. Sec. 1, Art. XIV provides: The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. For the petitioners, expanding the 10-year basic education cycle to 13 years (1 year mandatory kindergarten, 6 years elementary, 4 years junior high school, and 2 years senior high school) creates an undue burden to parents which violates free access to education. The goals sought to be achieved by the K to 12 Law may be achieved by improving the 10-year basic education cycle.
In resolving this issue raised by the petitioners, the SC stated that distinctions must be made between self-executing provisions of the Constitution and non-self-executing provisions.
Only self-executing provisions of the Constitution embody judicially enforceable rights and therefore give rise to causes of action in court. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
Sec. 1, Art. XIV is not self-executing. This provision was put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
As for Sec. 2, Art. XIV, though the Constitution made elementary education compulsory, it did not preclude Congress from making kindergarten and secondary education mandatory. This can be seen in the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution. The Constitution did not curtail the legislature’s power to determine the extent of basic education. It only provided a minimum standard: that elementary education be compulsory. By no means did the Constitution foreclose the possibility that the legislature provides beyond the minimum set by the Constitution.
3. The use of mother tongue as primary instruction for Grades 1 to 3 did not violate Secs. 6 and 7, Art. XIV which provide:
SECTION 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and other languages.
Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the educational system.
SECTION 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English.
The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein.
Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis.
Based on the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission, they intended to make Filipino and English to be the official language of instruction. But it was never the intent to make Filipino and/or English as the exclusive language of instruction. Congress has the power to enact a law that designates Filipino as the primary medium of instruction even in the regions but, in the absence of such law, the regional languages may be used as primary media of instruction. The Congress, however, opted not to enact such law. On the contrary, the Congress, in the exercise of its wisdom, provided that the regional languages shall be the primary media of instruction in the early stages of schooling. Verily, this act of Congress was not only constitutionally permissible, but was likewise an exercise of an exclusive prerogative to which the Court cannot interfere with.
