Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting:
I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the reiteration therein of the established doctrine that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against alleged aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship, and that “a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings.” I also agree with the conclusion that the petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board of Commissioners and Board of Special Inquiry, hereinafter referred to as the Boards, are quasi-judicial bodies.
However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of William Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to that doctrine and, above all, to the law which vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the Boards. Neither can I have solidarity with his opinion that this Court should, in this instance, rule on the citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these benefits would do violence to the law, liberally stretch the limits of the exceptions or misapply the exceptionary rule, and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact or circumstance exists to justify the application of the exceptions for the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the contrary, substantial facts exist to render immutable the unqualified application of the law and the doctrine.
To my mind, the questioned acts of the Boards were done absolutely within their quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, the rule laid down in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25) and Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals (160 SCRA 848) does not apply.
Consequently, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and Our resolutions of 15 September 1987 and 2 April 1990 in G.R. No. 79635 (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.) and G.R. No. 80320 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.), respectively, and Our decisions of 16 March 1989, 22 December 1989, and 6 June 1990 in G.R. No. 83578 (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), 171 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 86625 (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.), 180 SCRA 609, 617, and in G.R. No. L-48113 (Yang vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), respectively, the Gatchalians should have invoked the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for appropriate redress instead of filing petitions for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90). The trial courts should have dismissed the cases. In issuing the questioned orders, respondents Judge Dela Rosa and Judge Capulong clearly acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
As to why William Gatchalian filed his petition before the former court and his wife and minor children filed a separate complaint before the latter has not been explained. It is to be noted that he is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, Counter-Petition). Therefore, he should have filed his petition with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. His wife and minor children are not parties to the case before the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Their causes of action are based mainly on their claim that the acts of the Boards against William tend to deprive plaintiff mother consortium and connubium and the plaintiffs minors protection and support. At once, the viability of their causes of action is doubtful; however, if indeed they have valid causes of action, they could have been joined as co-plaintiffs in the case filed by William. It appears then that their filing of a separate complaint before another court was part of a strategy to frustrate the proceedings before the Boards. As correctly maintained by the petitioning Boards, we have here a clear case of forum-shopping, especially considering the fact that on September 4, 1990, or two days before the filing of the case before the Valenzuela court the government filed a motion to dismiss the case before the Manila court. Forum-shopping has long been condemned and proscribed. In People vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (101 SCRA 450, 463), promulgated on 28 November 1980, this Court held that a party “should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different forums.” In the Resolution of 31 July 1986 in E. Razon Inc., et al. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R. No. 75197, this Court held:
The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-shopping, an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice. (See also Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34; Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. vs. PCGG, 153 SCRA 591; Minister of Natural Resources, et al. vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes, et al., 155 SCRA 566; Limpin vs. IAC, 161 SCRA 98; Collado vs. Hernando, 161 SCRA 639; Villanueva, et al. vs. Adre, et al., 172 SCRA 877; Danville Maritime, Inc. vs. COA, 175 SCRA 717; Crisostomo vs. SEC, 179 SCRA 154; Adlawan vs. Tomol, 179 SCRA 42; and Alonto vs. Memoracion, 185 SCRA 73).
William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping in the regional trial courts. Under the guise of a counter-petition, he is now before this Court in an active offensive role. This is a very clever, albeit subtle, ploy to bang directly to this Court the issue of his deportation and to divest the Boards of their original jurisdiction thereon. He could have done this at the first instance; he did not. He and his wife and minor children deliberately chose, instead, to separately go to the wrong court, evidently to delay the proceedings before the Boards, which they accomplished when the two judges separately issued orders restraining said Boards from commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and from proceeding with the deportation charges against William Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90).
Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665) cited in the ponencia as another authority which allows William Gatchalian to enjoy the protective mantle of the exceptionary rule affecting the exclusive power of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation to try and hear cases against aliens and in the process also determine their citizenship is either not applicable or is mis-applied. This case laid down the principle that “when the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. . . . If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability. . . .” (emphasis supplied). The word courts should not now be interpreted to mean or to include the regional trial courts because, as stated above, said courts do not have any appellate jurisdiction over the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry. This case was decided in 1955 yet, or twenty-six years before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The condition sine qua non then to an authorized judicial intervention is that the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, or as stated in Co vs. Deportation Board, (78 SCRA 104, 107), the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are no reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct.
The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even show, a conclusive or substantial evidence that William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen. On the contrary, very serious doubts surround such a claim from the beginning. His initial entry into the Philippines was made possible through a Certificate of Identity (as Filipino) which was issued on the basis of a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Then on 6 July 1962 the then new Board of Commissioners promulgated a written decision in I.C. Cases Nos. 61-2108-C to 61-2116-C inclusive (Application for admission as Philippine citizens of Jose, Elena, Benjamin, Juan, Pedro, Gloria, Francisco, William and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian) reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of 6 July 1961 and ordering the exclusion of William Gatchalian and the others as aliens not properly documented. Accordingly, a warrant of exclusion, also dated 6 July 1962, was issued by the Commissioners commanding the deportation officer to exclude William Gatchalian, and others, and to cause their removal from the country on the first available transportation in accordance with law to the port of the country of which they were nationals. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads as follows:
The claim to Philippine citizenship of above-named applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order, dated July 12, 1960. It is alleged that applicants JOSE GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, ELENA GATCHALIAN and BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN are the legitimate children of Santiago Gatchalian with one Chiu Gim Tee. Except for the self-serving testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and his alleged children, there has not been submitted any evidence of Santiago Gatchalian’s marriage to Chiu Gim Tee and the birth of the alleged children of the couple. The personal records of Santiago Gatchalian on file with this office do not reflect the names of applicants as his children, and while two names listed in his Form 1 (ACR application), Jose and Elena, bear the same name as two of herein applicants, the difference in the ages of said applicants, casts serious doubt on their identity. Apropos, the applicants JOSE GATCHALIAN, GLORIA GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, ELENA GATCHALIAN and BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN, not having satisfactorily proved as the children of Santiago Gatchalian, determination of the citizenship of the other applicants, JUAN GATCHALIAN, PEDRO GATCHALIAN and JOHNSON GATCHALIAN, whose right to Filipino citizenship are merely drawn from their fathers, Jose Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian, is unnecessary. (Decision, Annex “E” of Petition).
Looking back to the case of Santiago, William’s alleged grandfather, I cannot find sufficient credible evidence to support his claim of Filipino citizenship. For a long time before 20 July 1960 he considered himself a Chinese citizen. The “conclusion” of the Bureau of Immigration that Santiago is a Filipino citizen is based on totally questionable and insufficient evidence which cannot inspire belief. The Order itself, signed by Associate Commissioner Felix Talabis, supports this conclusion. It reads in full as follows:
This is a petition for the cancellation of an alien registry of SANTIAGO GATCHALIAN, registered as Chinese and holder of ACR No. A-219003 issued at Manila on 13 February 1951 and ICR No. 7501 dated 3 May 1946. He is alleged to be the son of Filipino parents who were not lawfully married.
It is alleged that the petitioner was born in Binondo, Manila, on 25 July 1905, to Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian. It is noted that in his application for alien registration filed with this Office on 13 January 1951, Santiago Gatchalian stated that his deceased parents were Pablo Pacheco and Marciana. He was identified by his only brother, Joaquin Pacheco, who insisted that he and petitioner are illegitimate. It is true that, on record, there is a certificate signed on 26 October 1902 by Maxima Gatchalian, their maternal grandmother, giving consent to the marriage of Marciana Gatchalian to Pablo Pacheco (Exh. B), but Joaquin said that his parents did not actually get married. In proof of this, the baptismal record of the petitioner expressly states that Santiago Gatchalian was born on 25 July 1905 and baptized on 6 October 1905, being the son of Marciana Gatchalian, “Filipina”, and an unknown father (verbatim copy dated 22 June 1907, Parish Priest of Binondo, Manila).
The petitioner, apparently not completely certain about his civil status, has been interchangeably using his paternal and maternal surnames. In school he was known as Santiago Pacheco (Class card for 1920-21, Meisic, Manila; Certificates of completion of third and fourth grades, Meisic Primary School); but in his residence certificate dated 17 September 1937, and in Tax Clearance Certificate issued on 2 October 1937, he is referred to as Santiago Gatchalian; and in a communication dated 6 June 1941, he was addressed to as Santiago Pacheco by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes office.
Considering, however, the positive assertion by his elder brother who is better informed about their origin, the incontestable entry in his baptismal record that he is illegitimate and the entry in the marriage contract of his elder brother wherein the father’s name is omitted and the mother, Marciana Gatchalian, is described as Filipina (marriage contract dated 29 November 1936) there is sufficient evidence to establish that Santiago Gatchalian is really Filipino at birth, being the legitimate child of a Filipino woman.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition to cancel his alien registration is granted, petitioner shall henceforth be shown in the records of this office as a citizen of the Philippines and the issuance to him of the appropriate Identification certificate showing his correct status is hereby authorized. (Order of 12 July 1960, Annex “1” of Comment with Counter-Petition).
As to his alleged marriage to Chu Gim Tee, and their five children, we only have his self-selling oral testimony, thus:
Q What is the name of your wife?
A Her name is Chu Gim Tee.
Q Is she still alive?
A No, she died in 1951, in Amoy.
Q Do you have children with her, if so, mention their names, ages and sexes?
A Yes. I have five children, all of them alive and they are as follows:
Jose Gatchalian, born on Jan. 2, 1927 in Amoy; Gloria Gatchalian, born February 20, 1929 in Amoy; Francisco Gatchalian, born on March 3, 1931 in Amoy; Elena Gatchalian, born on April 4, 1933 in Amoy; Benjamin Gatchalian, born on 31 March 1942 in Amoy.
Q Where are they living now?
A All of them are now living in Macao, with my sister-in-law by the name of Chu Lam Tee. (p. 4, Transcript of the proceedings before the Citizen Evaluation Board on 12 February 1960, Annex “2” of Comment with Counter-Petition).
If indeed Santiago’s parents, Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, were married, what was his reason for insisting, through his brother Joaquin, that he, is an illegitimate son? The only possible reason is that Pablo Pacheco is a Chinese citizen, in which case Santiago would follow the citizenship of Marciana, a “Filipina.” But to give full faith and credit to the oral insistence of illegitimacy is to do violence to the presumptions of validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds and the legitimacy of children. (Art. 220, Civil Code). These are among the presumptions which the ponencia precisely applied when it rejected the petitioners’ claim that Santiago failed to establish his claimed marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Francisco’s (father of William) claimed marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok, both of which were allegedly celebrated abroad. I cannot find any valid justification why these presumptions should be liberally applied in favor of claimed marriages allegedly celebrated abroad but denied to purported marriages celebrated in the Philippines.
Interestingly, Santiago used the surname Pacheco during such proceedings and when he testified, he gave his name as Santiago Gatchalian Pacheco. This is an incontrovertible proof that he recognized the legitimate union of his father and mother.
On 18 February 1960, Santiago was recalled to be confronted re his claim as to the number of his children; he testified thus:
Q In your testimony on February 12, this year, you named as your children the following: Jose, Gloria, Francisco, Elena and Benjamin, all born in Amoy, arranged according to the order of their ages. However, in your Form 1 when you secured your ACR in 1951, you mentioned only Jose Gatchalian and Elena Gatchalian. Why, what is the reason why in this form that you filled up in 1951, you mentioned only Jose and Elena?
A That form I am not the one who filled it because that is not my handwriting. It is the handwriting of my broker or the clerk of my broker. However, when they prepared that I mentioned my children named Jose, Gloria, Francisco, Elena in a piece of paper which I gave to him, except Benjamin.
Q Why did you not mention Benjamin in the list?
A Because he was not yet baptized then. (Transcript, p. 7, Annex “2” of Comment with Counter-Petition).
The explanation is very flimsy and does not deserve the respect of a passing glance.
There is no showing that Gatchalian took any immediate definite positive step against the 6 July 1962 decision and the warrant of exclusion.
It was only sometime in 1973, or eleven years after, that he and others covered by the warrant of expulsion filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry. There has been no explanation for the unreasonable delay in the filing of the motion. It may be surmised that it was due to his minority, considering that he was allegedly only twelve years old when he arrived in Manila from Hongkong on 27 June 1961. But, such minority was no obstacle to the filing of any remedial action for and in his behalf.
The action taken by and the recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry of 14 March 1973 to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda for the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners were not only highly anomalous, irregular and improper, it was done without any semblance of authority. The Board of Special Inquiry did not have the power to review, modify or reverse a Decision of the Board of Commissioners rendered about eleven years earlier. Then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda, acting alone, did not likewise have the power or authority to approve the recommendation of said Board, to revive and/or reaffirm the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, to reverse, and nullify, the Decision of 6 July 1962 of the Board of Commissioners, and to order the admission of William Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to Sec. 26 (b) of C.A. No. 613, as amended (The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940), only the Board of Commissioners can act on the recommendation, if at all it was legally and validly done. The Board of Commissioners is composed of the Commissioner of Immigration and the two Deputy Commissioners. In the absence of any member of the Board, the Department Head shall designate an officer or employee in the Bureau of Immigration to serve as member thereof. In any case coming before it, the decision of any two members shall prevail. (Sec. 8, C.A. No. 613 as amended). The Department Head referred to is the Secretary of Justice since the Commission is, for administrative purposes, under the supervision and control of the Department of Justice.
The decision then of Acting Commissioner Nituda was void and invalid ab initio. In view thereof, the rationalization in the ponencia that the issue could be re-opened since the decision of the Board of Commissioners of 6 July 1962 did not constitute res judicata is irrelevant. But even if it is to be conceded that the 6 July 1962 decision did not constitute res judicata, I find it both strange and illogical to give full faith and credit to the unilateral action of Mr. Nituda and to use it to bar the Boards from exercising its power and jurisdiction over William Gatchalian.
Assuming that indeed William is the grandson of Santiago, I find it rather strange why Santiago did not mention him in his testimony before the Citizenship Evaluation Board. At that time William was already eleven years old. It is logical to presume that the proceeding initiated by Santiago was principally for the benefit of his alleged children and grandchildren. It was, as subsequent events proved, intended to prepare the legal basis for their entry into the country as Filipino citizens. Thus, eleven months after he obtained a favorable decision from the Board, and on two successive dates, his alleged children and grandchildren entered the country. On 25 June 1961 his alleged children Jose, Elena, Benjamin, and his alleged grandchildren Pedro and Juan arrived from Hongkong. On 27 June 1961, his alleged daughter Gloria and son Francisco with his alleged children William and Johnson also arrived from Hongkong. (pp. 4-5, Petition).
That he has continuously resided in the Philippines since 1961; he is married to Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973, and his marriage contract shows that he is a Filipino citizen; he holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino; he is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage; he is engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973, and is a director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino, and that the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling investment provided a livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000 dependents; he is a taxpayer; and he has continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship, discharged his responsibility as such until petitioning Boards initiated the deportation proceedings against him, are not of any help to William Gatchalian. For, they neither confer nor strengthen his claim of Filipino citizenship since they are all rooted on the illegal and void decision of then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda of 15 March 1973. A decision which is void and invalid ab initio cannot be a source of valid acts. Neither can such substantive infirmity be cured by salutary acts that tend to confirm the status conferred by the void decision.
In the light of the foregoing, it follows that the warrant of exclusion issued against William Gatchalian pursuant to and by virtue of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of Commissioners subsists and remains valid and enforceable.
I disagree with the view advanced in the ponencia that the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion because it is already barred by prescription considering that Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation “shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises.”
Said paragraph (b) of Section 37 reads in full as follows:
(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported. (As amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 503). (Emphasis supplied).
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12, the limitation does not apply. These clauses read as follows:
(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
x x x x x x x x x
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a non- immigrant;
(8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public officials because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;
x x x x x x x x x
(11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of any criminal action which may be brought against him;
(12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred and Seventy-Three, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2); besides, the warrant for his exclusion was issued within a period of five years following his entry.
Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065) is not applicable to Mr. Gatchalian. In issue in that case was the deportation of a minor whose mother fraudulently entered the Philippines by using the name of a resident Chinese merchant who is not her lawful husband but against whom no deportation proceedings was initiated within five years following her entry. Said mother did in fact acquire permanent residence status. Furthermore, the minor’s mother never claimed to be a Filipino citizen.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the questioned orders of respondents Judge Joselito Dela Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as having been issued beyond their jurisdiction, ORDER the DISMISSAL of Civil Case Nos. 90-54214 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and 3431-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and to DISMISS for lack of merit the COUNTER-PETITION.
