Suggested Answers to the 2026 Political and International Law Bar Exam Questions
1. Lawyers Shalom and Shanon, together with other individuals (Sha Group), commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. The Sha Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their Initiative Petition. The Initiative Petition seeks among others, to change the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1–7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1–4 of Article VII (Executive Department). The proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral Parliamentary form of government. The Sha Group alleged that the Initiative Petition had the support of more than 6.3 million individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. Should the petition be granted? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the petition should not be granted. Under the Constitution, amendments may be proposed by the people through an initiative but revisions may only be proposed by a Constituent Assembly or by a Constitutional Convention. In this case, the shift from a Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary System is a constitutional revision as it essentially changes our framework of government. Therefore, the Sha Group’s petition must be denied since their proposed changes are revisions which may not be proposed through an initiative.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Lambino vs COMELEC; Defensor-Santiago vs COMELEC
2. The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), pursuant to its power under the law, decided to expand its casino operations in San Fernando City, by leasing and renovating a portion of Surfer Hotel. In response to the strong opposition from various conservative groups who denounced the project as inimical to public morals and welfare, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Fernando City enacted two ordinances, one prohibiting the issuance of business permits to any establishment used wholly or partly for casino operations and another ordinance providing for the outright prohibition of casino operations within city limits and prescribing administrative fines, closure, and imprisonment for violators. PAGCOR and the owner of Surfer Hotel filed a petition challenging both ordinances as ultra vires and invalid for violating the policy on local autonomy and exercise of delegated power to local governments. Are the ordinances valid? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the ordinances are not valid. Local government units may exercise police power through local legislation. However, since this power was delegated by Congress, local government units, in exercising police power, must not contravene laws passed by Congress. In this case, PAGCOR, which was created by Congress, is empowered to allow the operation of casinos. Casinos are legal so long as they are authorized by PAGCOR whose power was granted by Congress. Local legislative bodies cannot invalidated an act of Congress via ordinances. Therefore, the ordinances are not valid.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Magtajas vs Pryce Properties
3. Following the insistent requests of high-ranking Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) officials, Congress enacted an appropriation law containing provisions that give individual legislators the discretion to determine, post enactment, how much funds would go to specific Flood Control Projects or beneficiaries which they themselves also determine. Consequently, disbursements were made by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) pursuant thereto.
During the investigations in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, DPWH officials and some contractors testified that most of the contracts for flood control projects were awarded to contractors owned by family members of, or endorsed by the legislators. They also mentioned that billions of pesos of “kickbacks” were delivered to certain legislators who “inserted” the funds for the flood control projects, which were found to be “ghost projects,” unfinished, abandoned, or of substandard quality. Is the appropriation law unconstitutional? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the appropriation law is unconstitutional as it runs contrary to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers. Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, the legislature creates the law while the executive implements the law. In this case, by empowering legislators to identify flood control projects and their beneficiaries and further empowering the individual legislator to determine how the funds are disbursed, the legislature and their individual members are already encroaching upon an executive function, that is, implementing the appropriation law. Therefore, the appropriation law is unconstitutional.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Belgica vs Executive Secretary
4. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee has called for legislative investigations and inquiries into various issues and charges of incompetence and corruption against some Executive Department officials. To ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege, and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in legislative inquiries, the President issued Executive Order No. 111 (E.O. 111), which provides for rules and guidelines during question hour and inquiries in aid of legislation, the scope of executive privilege, and the list of executive officials covered by the executive privilege. E.O. 111 prohibits the executive officials named therein from appearing before Congressional investigations without prior approval of the President. The Senate, led by the Senate President, filed a petition before the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of E.O. 111. Is E.O. 111 unconstitutional? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is partially invalid. Under prevailing jurisprudence, appearance in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation is mandatory. Hence, the provision of E.O. 111 prohibiting executive officials from appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation is not valid.
Further, the provision of E.O. 111 providing for the rules and guidelines during question hour and inquiries in aid of legislation is void. Under the Constitution, only Congress may set its rules on how to conduct its proceedings. E.O. 111 unduly encroaches upon this power of Congress.
However, E.O. 111’s provision on prohibiting executive officials from attending the question hour without prior approval of the President is valid. Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers and under prevailing jurisprudence, appearance during the question hour is not mandatory. Congress may only request the appearance of executive officials but their appearance may not be made mandatory.
Therefore, E.O. 111’s provision on the appearance of executive officials during question hour is valid while the rest is invalid.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Senate vs Ermita; Sabio vs Gordon
5. The Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability of the House of Representatives conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation pertaining to the use by the Provincial Government of Cagayan of its shares from the excise taxes on locally manufactured Virginia-type cigarettes for a purpose other than that provided in Republic Act No. 7171. Due to the evasive answers of the invited provincial government officials (officials) to questions, they were cited in contempt and ordered detained. The officials filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals (CA). After several hearings, the CA issued a writ of habeas corpus and granted the officials’ motion for provisional release. The legislators who were dismayed by the CA’s actions issued a show cause order against the three Justices of the CA Division who issued the writ and ordered the officials’ provisional release. The CA Justices were directed to explain why they should not be cited in contempt by the House of Representatives. May the House of Representatives cite the CA Justices in contempt? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the legislative’s contempt power is merely incidental to its power of legislative inquiry in aid of legislation. In this case, the House of Representatives’ exercise of its contempt power is not in aid of legislation but rather as a way to question a ruling promulgated by the Court of Appeals. The show-cause order issued by the House of Representatives was obviously not issued in relation to any legislation. Therefore, the House of Representatives may not cite the CA Justices in contempt.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to discipline judges and justices of the lower courts. This constitutional mechanism ensures the separation of powers of the three branches of government. A contempt case is essentially a disciplinary action and the House of Representatives cannot cite in contempt CA Justices without violating the Doctrine of Separation of Powers.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Arnault vs Nazareno; Ong vs Senate
6. As public discussions center on having a more effective criminal justice system to prevent further flood control scandals, a suggestion was raised in an academic forum to change by legislation and rule amendment the standard required in proving guilt for crimes involving infrastructure corruption from the present burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt to preponderance of evidence. Will such a change be valid? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Such a change will not be valid. Under the Constitution, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court. Fixing the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is a power reserved in the Supreme Court. Congress cannot encroach upon this function without violating the Doctrine of Separation of Powers. Therefore, the proposed change will not be valid.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER 1
No. Such a change will not be valid. Under the Equal Protection Clause, all persons or things similarly situated must be similarly treated both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In this case, the proposed legislation fails to establish that crimes involving infrastructure corruption are in a class of their own so much so that they needed special treatment. Without a valid classification, accused facing crimes involving infrastructure corruption will be unduly discriminated since lesser evidence will be needed to convict them as compared with other crimes similarly situated with what they are facing which require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER 2
No. Such a change will not be valid if applied retroactively. Under the Constitution, Congress is prohibited from passing ex post facto laws. An example of an ex post facto law is one which alters rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the accused. As such, the proposed change will not be valid.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Estipona vs Lobrigo
7. Arthur is a staff in the Office of the President’s public assistance office. He was issued a laptop to be used exclusively for processing and evaluating requests for financial assistance. He was asked to surrender his old office-issued laptop in exchange for a brand-new replacement. As the technical team was scanning Arthur’s old office-issued laptop, they found a folder containing back-up data and files on Arthur’s personal mobile phone, which had messages showing that he was soliciting and accepting bribes from the office’s clients in exchange for expedited processing of their financial assistance requests. When asked to explain why he should not be charged administratively, Arthur argued that his right to privacy was violated because what was accessed and opened was a private non-work file containing data from his personal device. He further insisted that any matter retrieved therefrom is inadmissible in evidence. Is Arthur correct? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Arthur is not correct. Under the Constitution, the State may not intrude upon an individual’s personal matters as this would violate his or her right to privacy. By reason of this right, every individual has the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nevertheless, the right to privacy may be waived. In this case, Arthur waived his right to privacy when he voluntarily surrendered the government-issued laptop without deleting his personal files and electronic documents therefrom. The laptop is a government issued property to which Arthur does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Government property is always subject to government control and audit.
There is also no merit in his argument that the evidence obtained from the laptop is inadmissible. Again, there is no unreasonable search and seizure as the laptop was voluntarily surrendered by Arthur. Even assuming that the search and seizure was unreasonable, the evidence obtained is still admissible by reason of the Inevitable Discovery Exception which states that an evidence illegally obtained may still be admissible if it can be shown that the same evidence may be inevitably gained even without the unlawful search and seizure. In this case, the laptop is a government issued laptop which is susceptible to government audit and inspection at any time which renders its content subject to inevitable discovery.
Further still, it cannot be said that the content of the laptop was unlawfully obtained since no law enforcement agent was involved in obtaining without warrant the laptop and its content.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: OCA vs Reyes
8. Corruption Fighters (CF), a non-governmental organization, is organizing a rally against flood control corruption in front of the Mendiola Peace Arch, to be held in the first week of October. CF filed an application for a permit a week before the planned rally. However, the mayor of Manila denied the permit due to the risks to the life and limb of the CF members. Reports indicated that a possible super typhoon will inundate the city during the planned rally date possibly causing knee-deep flooding around the Mendiola area. The mayor thus advised CF to conduct the rally at another time. CF filed a suit questioning the denial of the permit. It explains that holding a rally during rain and flooding is part of its message as it highlights the grave effects of flood control corruption. If you were the judge, what level of scrutiny would you employ to resolve the case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the judge, I will employ the Intermediate Scrutiny Test to resolve the case. The Intermediate Scrutiny Test as applied in freedom of expression cases employ a content-neutral approach whereby in regulating the exercise of the freedom of speech and expression, the State merely considers the time, place, and manner as to which when, where, and how the rights are to be exercised. In this case, the mayor denied the permit based on the fact there is an incoming super typhoon which will coincide with the rally if approved. The rights of CF were not denied. CF’s rights were merely regulated as to when and where such rights may be exercised. Such regulation is within the power of the mayor under the Intermediate Scrutiny Test.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: German vs Barangan; Reyes vs Bagatsing
9. In June 2020, Emer applied for confirmation of title of a land he inherited from his deceased parents, who had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the same since May 1990. While the possession was duly proven, the trial court, in June 2021, denied the application absent proof of the approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) declaring that the land is alienable and disposable. In August 2021, Emer appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
In August 2026, while the case was still pending before the CA, Emer filed a motion thereat asking that he be allowed to present additional evidence to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Emer listed what he intends to present, which are the matters required by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 11573. The CA denied the motion and opined that Republic Act No. 11573, which took effect on September 1, 2021, does not apply to Emer’s case which was filed in 2020; and that even if Emer complies with Section 7 of Republic Act No. 11573, there is still no confirmation that the land is no longer retained by the state for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth. Is the CA correct? Explain.
**Not sure why this was asked under POLITICAL LAW. I submit that this should be a bonus question. I cannot make out the Political Law aspect of the question. Section 7, RA 11573 delves on rules on evidence in judicial confirmation of title cases – a political law question may be had here because rules of court is the domain of the Supreme Court not of Congress but then again, the question was not couched that way. Facts of the case also did not indicate that RA 11573 was enacted in 2021 so the examiner assumed that the examinee knows this fact. This is somewhat related to the Regalian Doctrine but there was no mention of it in the question. Anyway:
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The CA is not correct. In Republic vs. Pasig Rizal (February 2022), the Supreme Court ruled that R.A. 11573 is retroactively applicable. Hence, even if Emer’s case was filed in 2020 prior to the enactment of R.A. 11573, the favorable provisions of the law are applicable to the case of Emer. Further, as ruled in the same case, if Emer is able to prove that indeed the subject property is alienable and disposable then the land is immediately placed within the commerce of men and there is no need for further confirmation that the subject property is no longer retained by the state for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that there must be a positive act from the government declaring land as alienable and disposable before it may be open for private ownership. However, R.A. 11573 has made judicial confirmation of title easier. In Republic vs. Pasig Rizal (February 2022), the Supreme Court ruled that R.A. 11573 is retroactively applicable. Hence, even if Emer’s case was filed in 2020 prior to the enactment of R.A. 11573, the favorable provisions of the law are applicable to the case of Emer. Further, as ruled in the same case, if Emer is able to prove that indeed the subject property is alienable and disposable then the land is immediately placed within the commerce of men and there is no need for further confirmation that the subject property is no longer retained by the state for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Republic vs Pasig Rizal Co.
10. The Department of Energy (DOE) is conducting surveys for possible native hydrogen exploration in, among others, the province of Zambales. An Indigenous Peoples (IP) group in the area has voiced concerns and asked that no such surveys be conducted in the coastal waters of Zambales. They claim that it is part of their ancestral domain for having been their traditional fishing waters, although no formal delineation has yet to be done.
A DOE official is concerned that the water claim may jeopardize the hydrogen exploration project and the existing petroleum service contracts off the coast of Zambales. He opines that the claim over the coastal waters as ancestral domain is doubtful as Republic Act No. 8371 is primarily concerned with land areas. To address this, he proposes that the DOE negotiate with the IP group for the latter to limit their ancestral domain claim to land areas only and DOE, in turn, will not conduct the surveys in the coastal waters. Is the opinion of the DOE official on the water claim and negotiation tenable? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The opinion of the DOE official on the water claim is not tenable. Under the Constitution, the State shall protect the rights of indigenous people to their ancestral lands. As a rule, ancestral rights are inalienable and indivisible. To this end, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act was passed which provides that indigenous people have the right not only to ancestral lands but to their ancestral domains which include coastal waters. For a DOE official to suggest that the IP group limit their claim to lands and exclude their claim on the coastal water is tantamount to the government or the State failing to protect the rights of the IP group. Hence, the opinion by the DOE official on the IP group’s water claim is not tenable.
However, the opinion on negotiation is tenable. Under the Constitution, Congress may enact laws concerning ancestral domains and national resources. To this end, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act was passed which provides that ancestral domains may be subjected to mining but the free, prior, and informed consent of the IP group concerned must be obtained. Such consent may be obtained through negotiation. Hence, the opinion of the DOE official on negotiation is tenable.
11. Mayor Laureta was the mayor of the City of Manila for two consecutive terms but lost her bid for a third term to Mayor Hermosura. However, Mayor Hermosura was recalled and Mayor Laureta won the recall election and served her third term of office. Mayor Laureta wishes to continue as mayor for her fourth term.
On the other hand, Mayor Ruiz was the mayor of the Municipality of Santa Adelwiza for three consecutive terms. During her third term, the municipality was converted into a city. The city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. Mayor Ruiz wants to run as the first mayor of the City of Santa Adelwiza. Rule on the eligibility of Mayor Laureta and Mayor Ruiz to run again for office.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Mayor Laureta is eligible. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule is applicable if the following are present:
- that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
- that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms
In this case, Mayor Laureta was not elected for three consecutive terms because she actually lost to Mayor Hermosura when she ran a third time as mayor of Manila. Her win in the recall election is not considered as a third term under the three-limit rule because her lost in the regular mayoralty election is considered a break in the counting of her consecutive terms.
Mayor Ruiz is not eligible to run as mayor of the City of Santa Adelwiza. Under prevailing jurisprudence, a municipality which was converted into a city does not create a new local government post. This means that the office of the mayor of the Municipality of Santa Adelwiza is the same as the office of the mayor of the City of Santa Adelwiza. That being, for purposes of the three-limit rule, the three consecutive terms served by Mayor Ruiz as mayor of the then municipality of Santa Adelwiza bar her from running as the first mayor of the City of Santa Adelwiza.
Therefore, Mayor Laureta is eligible while Mayor Ruiz is not.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Latasa vs COMELEC; Lonzanida vs COMELEC
12. With the approach of the January 2028 National and Local Elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) authorized the conduct of voter registration and voting activities in the Kulungan City Jail, designating it as a special polling place for qualified Persons Deprived of Liberty (PDL) voters. The following PDLs sought to register and vote in the 2028 elections:
Cheska was convicted of estafa by final judgment and sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment. She is currently serving her sentence. She registered as a voter and sought to vote.
JK was convicted of rebellion, a crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government, and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. He has appealed his conviction and the appeal is currently pending before the Court of Appeals. He registered as a voter and sought to vote.
Mats is detained for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs punishable by life imprisonment under Republic Act No. 9165. He has not yet been arraigned and no plea has been entered. He sought to register and vote.
Rule on the eligibility of Cheska, JK, and Mats to register and vote in the 2028 elections.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 9371, which was upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court, the following PDLs are qualified to vote:
(1) confined in jail, formally charged for any crime/s and awaiting/undergoing trial; or
(2) serving a sentence of imprisonment for less than one (1) year; or
(3) whose conviction of a crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the firearms laws or any crime against national security or for any other crime is on appeal.
Based on the foregoing, Cheska is eligible to vote since her sentence of eight months imprisonment is less than one year.
JK is eligible to vote since his conviction is currently on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Mats is likewise eligible to vote because an information was already filed against him, he is currently confined and jail, and is awaiting trial.
Therefore, Cheska, JK, and Mats are eligible to vote as PDLs.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 9371, which was upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court, the following persons deprived of liberty are qualified to vote:
(1) confined in jail, formally charged for any crime/s and awaiting/undergoing trial; or
(2) serving a sentence of imprisonment for less than one (1) year; or
(3) whose conviction of a crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the firearms laws or any crime against national security or for any other crime is on appeal.
The Resolution also provides that a PDL may be qualified to vote in jail if on the day of the election, he or she must have been in jail for at least six months.
Based on the foregoing, Cheska is not eligible to register and vote as a PDL since her sentence is eight months imprisonment and by the time the May 2028 elections is here, she is already out of jail.
JK is eligible to vote since his conviction is currently on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Mats is likewise eligible to vote because an information was already filed against him, he is currently confined and jail, and is awaiting trial.
Therefore, Cheska is not eligible while JK and Mats are eligible to vote as PDLs.
NOTE: The question only pertains to registration which is why the alternative answer may be a bit of a stretch. Cheska may register as a PDL voter as she is qualified regardless of her release date. Under the COMELEC Rules, if she is out of jail by election time, she can still vote provided she was able to facilitate her transfer of voter’s registration by the time she is released. If released and she was not able to transfer her registration, she will not be allowed to vote in jail.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Aguinaldo vs New Bilibid Prison
13. The City of Laging Lunod is in the midst of the campaign period for the May 2025 National and Local Elections. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 11000, which mandates, among others, that campaign materials posted outside designated common poster areas should not exceed 2 feet by 3 feet and authorizing the COMELEC to remove, confiscate, and destroy oversized campaign materials, whether owned by candidates, political parties, or private individuals under “Oplan Baklas.”
During the campaign period, St. Raphael Academy, a private Catholic school in Laging Lunod, allowed its grounds to be used for the posting of large tarpaulins and murals all privately funded by volunteer supporters of one mayoral candidate Attorney Alfonso, prominently bearing his photograph, name, and slogan. The materials measured 10 feet by 15 feet each, well beyond the COMELEC’s size limit, all of which are obviously in favor of only one candidate and not for any social advocacy.
COMELEC field officers, implementing “Oplan Baklas,” forcibly entered the school compound, removed the tarpaulins, and confiscated the murals. St. Raphael Academy filed a petition before the Supreme Court challenging the COMELEC’s actions. Will the petition prosper? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the regulation banning oversized campaign materials applies only to campaign materials posted by political parties and candidates. Campaign materials posted by private individuals in their private properties are protected by free speech and may not be regulated by COMELEC. In this case, the oversized campaign materials were posted by private individuals and not by the candidate Attorney Alfonso. Hence, the petition by St. Raphael Academy will prosper.
ALTERNATIVER ANSWER:
Yes. Under the Constitution, every individual is protected from unreasonable search and seizure. To this end, law enforcement officers must first obtain a warrant before implementing any search and seizure. In this case, COMELEC, which was tasked to implement election laws, does not appear to have obtained any search warrant prior to entering the school compound to remove the tarpaulins and campaign materials.
It is true that warrantless searches and seizure is allowed in certain instances such as in search incidental to a valid arrest or under the plain view doctrine but neither of these cases exist here. The search and seizure was not conducted after a valid arrest. Under prevailing jurisprudence, an oversized campaign material in a private property is not a contraband material.
Hence, the petition by St. Raphael Academy will prosper.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: St. Anthony College vs COMELEC
14. Mayor Jose Guinto is the incumbent Mayor of the City of Binibini, a first-class city with a total of 300,000 registered voters. He ran for re-election in the May 2025 elections against his rival Lorenzo Pilak (Pilak). Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7166, in relation to the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), the allowable campaign expenditure for a candidate for city mayor is PHP per voter for a candidate with a political party, or PHP per voter for an independent candidate. Mayor Guinto ran under Partido ng Bano (PNB) making his allowable spending limit PHP x 300,000 = PHP 900,. During the campaign period, the following expenditures were made in connection with Mayor Guinto’s reelection campaign:
Item 1. Mayor Guinto’s campaign team directly purchased television advertising slots on three local and national television networks, spending a total of PHP 850,, documented by advertising contracts and broadcast logs signed by Mayor Guinto’s authorized representative.
Item 2. Mahirap Business Club (MBC), a private business organization composed of Binibini’s prominent businessmen, independently produced and aired a television advertisement praising Mayor Guinto’s infrastructure projects and urging viewers to re-elect him. MBC spent PHP 2 million on the advertisement which aired for several months. MBC’s president stated in a sworn affidavit that MBC produced the advertisement independently, without any request from or coordination with Mayor Guinto’s campaign team, purely as an exercise of the organization’s freedom of expression in support of a candidate they believed in.
Item 3. PNB spent PHP 1.5 million on campaign materials prominently bearing Mayor Guinto’s name, photograph, and the words “IBOTO SI MAYOR GUINTO.” The PNB provincial chairman certified that these materials were produced and distributed by the party independently, without request from Mayor Guinto’s personal campaign team.
If all three items are counted toward Mayor Guinto’s campaign spending, the total is PHP million. However, if only Item 1 (Mayor Guinto’s direct campaign spending) is counted, the total is PHP 850,.
Mayor Guinto won the election against Pilak and was proclaimed the winning candidate and took his oath of office as City Mayor of Binibini. Dismayed, Pilak filed a Petition for Disqualification against Mayor Guinto before the COMELEC under Section 68(c) of the OEC for campaign overspending.
In his defense, Mayor Guinto argues that the MBC advertisement and the PNB campaign materials should not be counted toward his campaign spending limit because they were made by independent third parties without any request from or coordination with his campaign team, and represented the exercise of their own constitutional right to free expression in favor of a candidate of their choice. He further avers that the law only penalizes the candidate’s spending, not that of independent supporters. He claims that he cannot be held liable for third-party spending that he did not authorize, request, or know about. Is Mayor Guinto correct? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Under prevailing jurisprudence, a candidate’s election spending excludes expenses by his or her political party and those made independently by his or her supporters that were not coordinated with the candidate. In this case, Item 3 or the expenses made by PNB for mayor Guinto should not be counted towards the spending limit of Mayor Guinto as it should be treated as expenses by his political party and not by Mayor Guinto as a candidate.
Item 2 or the expenses by MBC for Mayor Guinto should also be excluded as it appears that they were made without coordination with Mayor Guinto. Without Mayor Guinto’s coordination, the expenses made by MBC should not be counted towards Mayor Guinto’s spending limit.
Hence, with Item 2 and Item 3 excluded, only Item 1 remains and it is within the allowable spending limit.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Mayor Guinto is partly correct.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, a candidate’s election spending excludes expenses by his or her political party. In this case, Item 3 or the expenses made by PNB for mayor Guinto should not be counted towards the spending limit of Mayor Guinto as it should be treated as the independent expenses by his political party and not by Mayor Guinto as a candidate.
On the other hand, Item 2 or the expenses by MBC for Mayor Guinto should be included in computing Mayor Guinto’s spending limit. Under the Fair Election Act, no broadcast material shall be had without the approval of the candidate. In this case, since the MBC’s paid television advertisements for Mayor Guinto’s candidacy were aired, there is a presumption that Mayor Guinto accepted the paid advertisement. Such acceptance constitutes his coordination with MBC and that renders MBC’s expenses as countable towards Mayor Guinto’s spending limit.
Hence, with Item 1 and Item 2 included, Mayor Guinto’s election expenditure amounts to PHP 2,850, which is more than the allowable spending limit for a mayoralty candidate in Binibini.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Ejercito vs COMELEC
15. Deanna and Lec are best friends in law school. On March 6, 2025, both were appointed by the President to assume positions vacated by their respective predecessors. Deanna was appointed as Ombudsman when the former Ombudsman resigned after serving exactly two years of his seven-year term. Lec was appointed as Commission on Audit Chair when the former Chair resigned after serving exactly two years of his seven-year term. Will both Deanna and Lec serve for seven years, or until 2032? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Only Deanna will serve a fresh term of seven years as Ombudsman. Under the Ombudsman Act, a newly appointed Ombudsman shall serve for a full term and not merely for the unexpired portion of the term of his or her predecessor. In this case, Deanna was appointed to replace the previous Ombudsman who resigned two years into his seven-year term. Under the law, Deanna as the new Ombudsman is entitled to a fresh seven-year term.
On the other hand, Lec shall only serve the unexpired portion of the term of the Chair she replaced. Under the Constitution, the Chairs and Commissioners of the constitutional commissions, when appointed to replace a commissioner or chair who resigned, died, incapacitated, or was removed through impeachment, shall only serve the unexpired portion of the term of their predecessor.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Funa vs COA; Vitangcol III vs Carpio Morales
16. An international organization operating in Philippine territory was sued for illegal termination before a Philippine labor arbiter. The international organization claimed that under international law, it was immune from the jurisdiction of the Philippine State, and thus, cannot be sued for illegal termination. Is the international organization correct? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The international organization is not correct. Under prevailing jurisprudence, mere invocation of immunity from suit by an international organization is not sufficient to dismiss a suit against it for the reason that there is no absolute immunity from suit for international organizations. Generally, only official functions by the international organization are covered by immunity from suit. In this case, trial must proceed and the international organization must prove that the questioned act is an official function which enjoys immunity.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Liang vs People
17. A candidate for the House of Representatives claims to be a natural-born Philippine citizen based on a treaty creating a presumption under international law that he is a natural-born citizen. However, the Philippines is not a party to the treaty. Is the candidate correct? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The candidate is not correct. The 1987 Constitution defines natural-born citizen as one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his or her Philippine citizenship. Under the principle of constitutional supremacy, this definition prevails over a treaty regardless if we are a party to it or not. Therefore, there cannot be a presumption of Philippine citizenship based on a treaty.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Reyes vs Bagatsing
18. The Philippines participated in the negotiation of a multilateral treaty, which required signature and ratification for a state to become a party to such treaty. The Philippine ambassador signed the treaty on behalf of the Philippines but the text of the treaty was intentionally not transmitted to the Senate for its concurrence. May the Office of the President be compelled to transmit the text of the treaty for Senate concurrence? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate for concurrence. The power to enter into treaties is a power vested in the President and even though the President ratified a treaty, the President may not be compelled to submit it to the Senate for its concurrence. Therefore, the Office of the President may not be compelled to transmit the text of the treaty for Senate concurrence.
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: Pimentel, Jr. vs Executive Secretary
19. The extradition treaty between the Philippines and Kingdom A expired after twenty years. During the negotiations for a new extradition treaty, Kingdom A requested for the extradition of its citizen who was hiding in the Philippines, in order that he may attend a legislative inquiry on large-scale online scamming allegedly involving such citizen. The online financial crimes are punishable by a heavy fine under the laws of Kingdom A. Should the extradition request be granted? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Under prevailing rules, an individual may only be extradited to the Requesting State if he or she were to serve a sentence or if he or she were to be held for a criminal investigation in the Requesting State. In this case, the reason for the extradition request was for the individual to attend a legislative inquiry which is neither a criminal investigation nor for the individual to serve a sentence in Kingdom A. Therefore, the extradition request should not be granted.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. Under prevailing rules, an extradition request or a petition for extradition must allege the applicable extradition treaty. In this case, the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and Kingdom A has already expired. Since it has already expired, then there can be no applicable extradition treaty which is fatal to the petition. Therefore, the extradition treaty should not be granted.
NOTE: The question is: should the ER be granted. Under the rules, it is the SOJ that acts on the request. Acting on the request on the SOJ level connotes that the SOJ may either grant or deny it. If the SOJ denies, then no petition for extradition may be filed in court. If the SOJ grants, then the SOJ shall represent the RS in court by filing the petition for extradition. This is where the question is not clear. Is the request pending with the SOJ or with the court?
APPLICABLE RULES: 2025 Rules on Extradition Proceedings
20. Due to the negligence of its naval commander, a foreign warship ran aground on a reef in Philippine waters causing massive marine pollution which violated Philippine environmental statutes. May the commander be sued before a Philippine court? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Under prevailing jurisprudence, a foreign official may not invoke immunity from suit if it is the official himself or herself who will be made to account for acts that violated the personal and property rights of others. In this case, it was already established by the facts that the naval commander is negligent. Hence, he or she may be made to account for the damages he caused. Being negligent is not covered by immunity from suit because being negligent is not part of the official function of a naval commander. Therefore, the commander may be sued before a Philippine court.
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