Valentino Legaspi vs City of Cebu

written by Howard

G.R. No. 159110; G.R. No. 159692 – 723 Phil. 901 – 711 SCRA 771 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Powers of the State – Police Power – Valid Exercise – Due Process Requirement – Clamping of Vehicles Violating Traffic Laws is Valid Exercise of Police Power

Local Government; Municipal Corporations – Devolution – Delegation of Powers – Valid Exercise of Police Power by LGUs – General Welfare Clause

In 1997, the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 which empowered its traffic enforcers to clamp vehicles which are caught violating traffic rules.

After the enforcement of the ordinance, the vehicles of Atty. Valentino Legaspi and Atty. Bienvenido Jaban, Sr. were clamped for traffic obstruction and illegal parking. The lawyers went to court and questioned the constitutionality of the traffic ordinance. They argued that the law was an invalid exercise of police power and that it violates due process because they were deprived of the use of their properties without being given the opportunity to be heard as the traffic enforcer, by having unbridled discretion, becomes the prosecutor, the judge, and the executor of the traffic law.

The RTC ruled in favor of Legaspi and Jaban and it declared Ordinance 1664 unconstitutional. The CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance authorizing traffic enforcers to clamp vehicles without a hearing being conducted is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code is a valid delegation by Congress to LGUs to exercise police power:

Section 16. General Welfare.- Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. xxx

Likewise, Sec. 458 of the LGC provides:

Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. – (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

xxx

Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places.

The plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu.

Further, the ordinance itself provides that the remedy of a vehicle owner who wants to question an act by a traffic enforcer is to bring it to the attention of the Traffic Head or to a City Prosecutor who are empowered to overrule the actions of the enforcer.

SIDE ISSUE: In a separate case before the same RTC that ruled on this case, Ordinance No. 1664 was declared unconstitutional. The parties in that case did not appeal. Legaspi argued that the decision in the separate RTC case should be respected and that a different ruling should be avoided. Is the argument tenable?

This argument by Legaspi is untenable. The RTC in that separate case had improperly acted on deciding that case despite knowing that there was a separate appeal (this case). The RTC should have anticipated that in the regular course of proceedings, the outcome of the appeal in these cases then pending before the CA would ultimately be elevated to and determined by no less than the SC itself. Such anticipation should have made it refrain from declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional, for a lower court like itself, appreciating its position in the “interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation,” should have exercised a “becoming modesty” on the issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance that the Constitution required the majority vote of the Members of the Court sitting en banc to determine. Such “becoming modesty” also forewarned that any declaration of unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only on the parties, but that a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court would be a precedent binding on all.

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